Very minor niggle, but France doesn't have an official opposition, and if it did it would be the left-wing alliance (New Popular Front), who actually won the largest number of seats but got locked out of government because Macron refused to admit he'd lost. Which isn't to say that Le Pen isn't favourite to win the Presidential election next time round.
I really enjoyed reading this as I have had the same feeling over the past weeks and you articulated it really well. I am hopeful, but following French and polish politics I feel we should not underestimate two things. The cynicism of these right-wing populists, even when their nation's security is at stake, and voters' fear of war. France may look much stronger to us now, but Jordan Bardella is still saying France is weak against an alliance of Russia and China. A strong European army may be a point of pride for centrists, he is saying the commission is usurping France's defense investments.
Of course they are contradicting themselves with every sentence. The contradictions are at an absolutely incredible point with Poland's PiS. In a country where Russia is generally hated, their presidential candidate is defending trump and musk over Zelenskyy and even the country's own foreign minister. Sure, it is probably not comfortable for them. But discontent over Ukrainian immigrants may make this a good argument with voters. It is all very confusing. Very curious to see how public opinion will evolve.
Backlashes are common but often don't represent true peaks. For example, some of BLM's excesses caused a backlash, but over all the movement did shift things in the direction they wanted (if not as far as they hoped). A series of waves moving higher up the beach is often a better model.
I don't disagree with much of what you say about the US, or its global implications. I wouldn't bet on any individual populist to stay the course. But as long as the conditions that created populism remain - stagnant growth and living standards, mass immigration amd strong educational polarisation - it seems most likely that populism will keep trending upwards (even if not monotonically).
Ben - if, big if, but if there is a structural weakness in what Trump is odong, will the cracks that may change the game appear in domestic politics, or the international? If domestic, are US courts and centrist public opinion strong enough (eg we hear of law firms not wanting to act against him for companies - they fear retribution; DOGE ignoring court injunctions). If international, how and where might this play out - a Putin/Trump bust up? Syria upending all hopes of progress on Gaza? Something from the Chinese? Or is the "grand" strategy - US gets the Arctic; R gets chunks of Europe; China gets Taiwan, a stronger impetus towards real structural change?
We might be at peak populism, but it's lasted long enough for the tech oligarchy that comes next to solidify in both the UK and US. And that has its claws in us, economically and cognitively, to such an extent there is no easy escape now.
Astute, entertaining piece. I don't know whether your hunch will be right but you make the case well. My worry, as you mention famines and terrors, is that Trump and his fellow arsonists manage to burn down America as they desperately try to cling to power amid increasing unpopularity.
Great read and thought provoking analysis, thanks for sharing freely. Your term 'chaotic authoritarianism' sums it up well although with Trump it's chaotic authoritarianism (ft. malignant narcissism) to give it the full title. May sound comical, and on one level it is, but listening to John Bolton recently (who even if disliked intensely was in a good position to form a solid opinion) it is this malignant narcissism that colours everything and underpins the chaos. According to Bolton, Trump doesn't do strategy, doesn't do history and in any case is not bothered about it, reacts to everything first and foremost on a personal emotional and self gratification level (often whims and grievances) and sees geopolitics as based on 'personal relationships' meaning he has 'great relationships' with Putin etc and cannot conceive that they can not 'like him back' or as is the reality, completely play him to their own ends.
Very minor niggle, but France doesn't have an official opposition, and if it did it would be the left-wing alliance (New Popular Front), who actually won the largest number of seats but got locked out of government because Macron refused to admit he'd lost. Which isn't to say that Le Pen isn't favourite to win the Presidential election next time round.
I really enjoyed reading this as I have had the same feeling over the past weeks and you articulated it really well. I am hopeful, but following French and polish politics I feel we should not underestimate two things. The cynicism of these right-wing populists, even when their nation's security is at stake, and voters' fear of war. France may look much stronger to us now, but Jordan Bardella is still saying France is weak against an alliance of Russia and China. A strong European army may be a point of pride for centrists, he is saying the commission is usurping France's defense investments.
Of course they are contradicting themselves with every sentence. The contradictions are at an absolutely incredible point with Poland's PiS. In a country where Russia is generally hated, their presidential candidate is defending trump and musk over Zelenskyy and even the country's own foreign minister. Sure, it is probably not comfortable for them. But discontent over Ukrainian immigrants may make this a good argument with voters. It is all very confusing. Very curious to see how public opinion will evolve.
Backlashes are common but often don't represent true peaks. For example, some of BLM's excesses caused a backlash, but over all the movement did shift things in the direction they wanted (if not as far as they hoped). A series of waves moving higher up the beach is often a better model.
I don't disagree with much of what you say about the US, or its global implications. I wouldn't bet on any individual populist to stay the course. But as long as the conditions that created populism remain - stagnant growth and living standards, mass immigration amd strong educational polarisation - it seems most likely that populism will keep trending upwards (even if not monotonically).
Ben - if, big if, but if there is a structural weakness in what Trump is odong, will the cracks that may change the game appear in domestic politics, or the international? If domestic, are US courts and centrist public opinion strong enough (eg we hear of law firms not wanting to act against him for companies - they fear retribution; DOGE ignoring court injunctions). If international, how and where might this play out - a Putin/Trump bust up? Syria upending all hopes of progress on Gaza? Something from the Chinese? Or is the "grand" strategy - US gets the Arctic; R gets chunks of Europe; China gets Taiwan, a stronger impetus towards real structural change?
Ben, why can’t you call them the far right? A lot of people have made a good case for not calling them populists.
Oh god not this debate...! I actually disagree with colleagues like Simon and Cas who think there is fixed agreement on this in the profession.
We might be at peak populism, but it's lasted long enough for the tech oligarchy that comes next to solidify in both the UK and US. And that has its claws in us, economically and cognitively, to such an extent there is no easy escape now.
Astute, entertaining piece. I don't know whether your hunch will be right but you make the case well. My worry, as you mention famines and terrors, is that Trump and his fellow arsonists manage to burn down America as they desperately try to cling to power amid increasing unpopularity.
I wrote something rather similar recently, for Peter Geoghegan's substack.
"The far right’s global tidal wave will break. Here’s why."
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/far-rights-global-tidal-wave-break-heres-why-peter-geoghegan-4c41f/?trackingId=dY5Zt6fTEGnBSdDTsAie3Q%3D%3D
(Also, "The Killer Faultlines in Europe's far right." https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/killer-faultlines-europes-far-right-nicholas-shaxson-xt3se/?trackingId=7ZAO%2BDZxv8xNBERUha9G7g%3D%3D )
My key point: above all, use the economic frame. There like the killer faultlines that the far-right can never close.
Great read and thought provoking analysis, thanks for sharing freely. Your term 'chaotic authoritarianism' sums it up well although with Trump it's chaotic authoritarianism (ft. malignant narcissism) to give it the full title. May sound comical, and on one level it is, but listening to John Bolton recently (who even if disliked intensely was in a good position to form a solid opinion) it is this malignant narcissism that colours everything and underpins the chaos. According to Bolton, Trump doesn't do strategy, doesn't do history and in any case is not bothered about it, reacts to everything first and foremost on a personal emotional and self gratification level (often whims and grievances) and sees geopolitics as based on 'personal relationships' meaning he has 'great relationships' with Putin etc and cannot conceive that they can not 'like him back' or as is the reality, completely play him to their own ends.
A "stationery bandit" is someone who steals your pen
Having carefully avoided paper thieves in your previous Mancur Olson post, you have inadvertently introduced them here!
Changed! I got it right in the Bluesky post and yet here...